










TENSION BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND (QUASI) 
MONOPOLY:  A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTROLLING 






Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm (“the norm”) is not appropriate for a country with a 
(quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize 
monopoly rents to the detriment of the national economy.  This Article 
provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments on the tension 
created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly, by exploring three key 
corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1) 
“controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders 
hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2) 
“tunneling” (i.e., the transfer of corporate wealth to controlling 
shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).   
First, given (quasi) monopoly, this Article considers the impact of 
CMS.  CMS controllers, due to their fractional economic interests (e.g., 
5% ownership), do not have a strong incentive to vigorously follow the 
norm.  When the norm is not actively sought, public shareholders lose the 
opportunity to gain the maximum monopoly profits.  A positive byproduct, 
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however, is that national welfare is improved, since non-maximized 
monopoly profits do not hurt society and consumers to the fullest extent.        
Second, given CMS and (quasi) monopoly, this Article analyzes 
the impact of tunneling.  Since tunneling provides more cash flows—
including illicit cash flows—to CMS controllers, it strengthens their 
incentive to maximize shareholder wealth.  The direct effect of tunneling 
to public shareholders is, by definition, negative.  Counter-intuitively, 
however, tunneling is indirectly beneficial—to some extent—to public 
shareholders, due to CMS controllers’ reinforced incentive to increase 
profits.  Thus, the net effect of tunneling on public shareholders is mixed.  
In regard to social welfare in (quasi) monopoly CMS, tunneling has a 
negative effect because it encourages CMS controllers to pursue 
monopoly rents in a more aggressive manner.    
Third, this Article calls into question the effectiveness of the norm 
in a context of Chinese SOEs that do their business in domestic markets.  
Formally, the controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs is the party-state.  
The party-state is, however, an agent of its citizens, who are the “ultimate 
shareholders” (and consumers).  Given the (quasi) monopoly held by 
SOEs in China, the norm will encourage SOE managers to set a 
monopoly-profit maximizing price in domestic markets.  Such pricing is 
beneficial to the citizens of China as the “ultimate shareholders” when the 
government holds a high percentage of ownership in an SOE.  However, 
the pricing damages the citizens of China as consumers.  Under certain 
circumstances, the combined effect of the norm on the “ultimate 
shareholders”—i.e., the citizens of China—could be a net loss if a 
significant amount of welfare in society disappears as dead-weight loss 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial organization and corporate governance are two 
significant topics when corporations pursue business goals, make strategic 
decisions, and deal with internal affairs.  Academics—both economists 
and legal scholars—and policy-makers tend to treat these two fields 
independently except in a few cases like mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  
This treatment simultaneously brings issues associated with monopoly 
regulation and investor protection. 
Generally, (quasi) monopoly—monopoly with the sole supplier,
3
 
and oligopoly, where a small number of market players wield a high level 
of price-setting power
4
—is deemed detrimental to society.  Most 
jurisdictions impose regulations on (quasi) monopoly via antitrust laws, 
competition laws, and laws against large business entities.
5
  One primary 
rationale for economics to regulate imperfect competition in a market is 
that a (quasi) monopolist charges a higher price, while supplying a smaller 
quantity of a good or service than it would in a competitive market.  This 
action transfers some of the economic surplus from consumers to the 
monopolist.
6
  In addition, “monopoly produces a net loss for society:”
7
 
namely, a deadweight loss (DWL).  Aside from this efficiency loss, a 
variety of fairness problems will emerge and cause many socio-political 
controversies.
8
   
Meanwhile, mainstream corporate governance scholarship, as 
exemplified by Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., articulates that the primary goal 
                                                 
3 ROBERT B. COOTER JR. & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 29 (Int’l ed., 6th ed. 2014) 
(“In a monopoly there is only one supplier; so, that firm and the industry are identical.”).  
Some scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers defend certain patterns and types of 
monopolies, such as natural monopolies and monopolies that enhance innovation.  See, e.g., 
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 388 (Global ed., 8th ed. 
2015) (explaining the concept of natural monopoly).  Such discussions on monopoly, 
though important, are beyond the scope of this Article.  For more explanation of economies 
of scale and a natural monopoly, see infra Part II.B.2.   
4 In general, oligopoly is defined as “a market structure in which a small number of inter-
dependent firms compete.”  R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY PATRICK O’BRIEN, 
MICROECONOMICS 432 (3rd. ed. 2010).  In this Article, oligopoly is narrowly defined as a 
market, where a few market players exercise dominant market power in terms of setting a 
price and/or the level of quantity.  If a small number of suppliers fiercely compete in a 
market without dominant market power, such a market structure does not constitute 
oligopoly in this Article.  In other words, when defining oligopoly, this Article focuses on 
individual corporations’ market power rather than simply the number of corporations in a 
specific market.  See infra Part II.B.                
5 For instance, China promulgated the Anti-Monopoly Law in 2007, taking effect in 2008.  
Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 
133 n.3 (2008). 
6 PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 371 (2nd ed. 2009).    
7 Id.   
8 See infra Part II.B.1. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4
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of a corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth,
9
 which is usually 
expressed as share price.  This view is also supported by Nobel laureate, 
Milton Friedman, in his famous essay The Social Responsibility of 
Business Is to Increase Its Profits.
10
  As the world economy has integrated, 
shareholder wealth maximization—in tandem with the shareholder 
primacy norm—has grown as an influential international standard.
11
   
However, in The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and 
Industrial Organization, Professor Mark Roe at Harvard Law School 
called into question the fundamental validity of shareholder primacy.  “In 
nations where product markets are not strongly competitive, a strong 
shareholder primacy norm fits less comfortably with national wealth 
maximization than elsewhere because, where competition is weak, 
shareholder primacy induces managers to cut production and raise price 
more than they otherwise would.”
12
 (emphasis added).  By analyzing 
potentially conflicting features of shareholder primacy in a given 
industrial organization, Roe pioneered uncharted territory in corporate 
governance.  Perhaps, while the shareholder wealth maximization norm is 
a better standard for the United States, where markets are relatively more 
competitive, it might not be “the” global standard, particularly in 
developing countries with an imperfectly competitive market tainted by 
monopolistic features.        
Regarding the tension between shareholder primacy and (quasi) 
monopoly, this Article examines three key factors that were not covered in 
Roe’s insightful research:  (1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS) (i.e., 
when dominant shareholders hold a small percentage of ownership);
13
 (2) 
                                                 
9 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).  
10 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, THE 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. Sep. 13, 1970, at 33.  But see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1520 (2007) (“Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, was a scandale because of its 
unvarnished emphasis on the shareholder value as virtually the sole criterion by which 
corporate performance should be judged.  This view seemed far out of the mainstream.”).    
11  Some corporate law scholars explain that the concept of “shareholder wealth 
maximization” is a subset of the broadly defined concept of “shareholder primacy.”  See, 
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 
16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 45-46 (2002) (“The term shareholder primacy typically connotes 
two distinct principles: (1) [t]he shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . [and] (2) [t]he 
principle of ultimate shareholder control.”).  In this Article, however, the term “shareholder 
primacy” is narrowly defined, so that it is used interchangeably with “shareholder wealth 
maximization” (thus “shareholder primacy” is not related to the concept of the “principle 
of ultimate shareholder control”).              
12 Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2063 (2001).   
13 In CMS, for example, a controlling shareholder holding a 5% economic interest in a 
corporation can wield 51% of the voting rights.  See generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., 
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency 
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“tunneling” (i.e., wealth transfer from a corporation to its controlling 
shareholder);
14
 and (3) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China.  
Traditionally, policy-makers and corporate governance scholars have 
criticized institutional features in emerging markets such as CMS and 
tunneling.  Also, Chinese SOEs have been considered highly inefficient 
due to their low profitability.
15
  In the analytical framework of shareholder 
wealth maximization and (quasi) monopoly, examining these three factors 
provides new implications on the interplay between corporate governance 
and industrial organization.         
Recognizing the significance and complicated functions of CMS, 
tunneling, and Chinese SOEs, this Article explores further research 
questions:  (1) Given (quasi) monopoly, how does CMS affect shareholder 
wealth maximization, investor protection, and social welfare?;
16
 (2) Given 
(quasi) monopoly and CMS, how does tunneling affect shareholder wealth 
maximization, investor protection, and social welfare?;
17
 and (3) Given the 
(quasi) monopolistic market power of Chinese SOEs, is there a chance 
that the shareholder wealth maximization norm will actually lower 
benefits to the (ultimate) shareholders of Chinese SOEs?
18
  To answer 
these questions, this Article provides new novel ideas and findings, some 
of which are counter-intuitive and contrary to the belief of extant 
corporate governance scholarship. 
In a country with (quasi) monopoly, three outcomes will arise 
when a controller’s percentage of ownership is substantially low, ceteris 
paribus (note that tunneling is not considered yet).
19
  First, the CMS 
                                                                                                               
Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9013.pdf (explaining CMS, voting leverage devices, and 
agency problems in CMS); see also, infra Part III.A.1 (providing a further explanation of 
CMS).  Due to its distortive features in shareholder voting, CMS is related to many 
corporate governance issues such as agency problems, investor protection, and takeover 
defenses.  See, e.g., Sang Yop Kang, Transplanting a Poison Pill to Controlling 
Shareholder Regimes—Why It Is So Difficult, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 619, 641-42 
(2013) (describing CMS as an “internal defensive device” in a takeover situation).        
14 See generally, Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. 
ECON. 430 (2008) (discussing corporate governance issues related to investor 
expropriation); Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000) (explaining 
the concept of tunneling).  
15 See, e.g., Fixing China Inc: Reform of State Companies Is Back on the Agenda, THE 
ECONOMIST, (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21614240-reform-
state-companies-back-agenda-fixing-china-inc (“Profitability of state companies has fallen, 
even as private firms have grown in strength.  SOE returns are now about half those of 
their non-state peers.”).  
16 For a further analysis of this question, see infra Part III.A and B.  
17 For a further analysis of this question, see infra Part III.C.  
18 For a further analysis of this question, see infra Part IV.  
19 See infra Part III.A and B (explaining potential outcomes of the CMS controllers’ weak 
incentive to follow the shareholder wealth maximization norm).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4
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controller will have a weak incentive to strictly follow the profit 
maximization norm, since economic interests between a controller and the 
monopolist corporation are less aligned.  Second, as a result, public 
investors’ economic interests are likely to be damaged, since deviation 
from profit maximization lowers the price and profits in monopoly.  Third, 
however, it is likely that the total efficiency of an economy, as well as 
consumer surplus, will be enhanced as the controller deviates from 
monopoly profit maximization.  Note that in (quasi) monopoly 
shareholder wealth maximization is defined as monopoly rent 
maximization.  Essentially, in terms of the level of welfare, the “square of 
a bad” (or “Bad
2
”)—the situation where a bad ownership structure of 
CMS and a bad industrial organization of (quasi) monopoly are 
combined
20
—is socially desirable to some extent.
21
  CMS is also attractive 
to controlling family shareholders in China due to the feature of utilizing 
other people’s money.  Since markets in China are less competitive, the 
foregoing discussion—based on the combination of CMS and (quasi) 
monopoly—provides similar implications in the Chinese context.       
When a CMS controller does not actively pursue monopoly profit 
maximization, all shareholders including the controller, bear the 
“opportunity cost” of losing monopoly profits that could have belonged to 
the shareholders.  By the definition of CMS, the controller’s opportunity 
cost is fractional.  Thus, when a CMS controller finds it personally more 
desirable to not seek shareholder wealth maximization, the controller is 
willing to assume this fractional opportunity cost.  For instance, by 
supplying more quantity of a good or service, a CMS controller can 
enlarge the size of a monopoly corporation.
22
  The controller will lose 
some monopoly profits on a pro-rata basis in the form of an opportunity 
cost.  On the other hand, the controller may absorb benefits from the 
enlargement almost solely for himself or herself.  In politics as well as in 
business, the size of a business often reflects the power of the controller.  
Alternatively, a CMS controller sometimes imposes personal philosophy 
onto corporate policy.  To illustrate, Jack Ma pledged that the goal of 
Alibaba was to make customers and employees better off,
23
 which is 
reminiscent of Henry Ford’s philanthropy in Dodge.  In the case of a CMS, 
the CMS controllers are the only ones psychologically compensated when 
their own belief is realized in the corporation’s policy while all 
shareholders—including the CMS controllers—bear the opportunity cost.  
                                                 
20 See infra Part III.A.2.    
21 Despite the positive effects of the “square of a bad,” however, other problems of (quasi) 
monopoly and CMS may persist.  See infra Part III.D.   
22 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 461 (2000) (observing that controlling shareholders pursue “non-
pecuniary returns,” particularly in Europe).   
23 See infra Part III.B.2 (explaining Jack Ma’s CMS and his policy of “customer first, 
employees second, shareholders third”).    
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In addition, their reputation—rather than that of the entire shareholders—
is enhanced, resulting in benefits to their future career.   
Now, consider the effects of a CMS controller’s tunneling, when a 
jurisdiction’s market structures are based on (quasi) monopoly and CMS.  
This situation is described as the “cube of a bad” (or “Bad
3
”), since 
another bad feature (i.e., tunneling) is added on top of the “square of a 
bad.”
24
  In this situation, three outcomes will arise as the level of tunneling 
is higher, ceteris paribus.  First, ironically, a CMS controller will have a 
stronger incentive to pursue the profit maximization norm.  This is 
because the controller’s economic interests in a corporation are 
strengthened through additional pecuniary benefits from tunneling.  
Second, tunneling is, by definition, detrimental to public shareholders.
25
  
On the other hand, however, due to the first outcome, tunneling will be—
counter-intuitively—beneficial to public shareholders at least to some 
extent, since shareholder wealth maximization will be induced by 
tunneling.
26
  As a result, the net effect of tunneling on the welfare of 
public investors will depend on the relative size of the two opposing 
effects.
27
  However, extreme tunneling will take away public investors’ 
confidence in a corporation and, eventually, most of them will not invest 
in the next stage.
28
  Third, the level of consumer surplus and national 
welfare will deteriorate as a CMS controller’s strengthened incentive to 
follow shareholder wealth maximization increases monopoly profits and 
generates larger DWL.  Since the quality of corporate governance in 
China is still low, the aforementioned three outcomes—generated from 
                                                 
24 For the further analysis of the “cube of a bad” (or Bad3), see infra Part III.C (explaining 
potential outcomes of tunneling in (quasi) monopoly CMS, with respect to the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm).   
25  See Djankov et al., supra note 14, at 430 (explaining “the problem of investor 
expropriation, sometimes also referred to as self-dealing or tunneling”); Johnson et al., 
supra note 14, at 22 (describing tunneling as “the expropriation of minority shareholders”).           
26 In this sense, the logic is also connected to an argument that public shareholders are not 
“unilateral victims,” since they participate in profit sharing with a controlling shareholder 
when surplus is transferred from consumers to a corporation in an imperfect competitive 
market.  See Sang Yop Kang, Re-envisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why 
Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Often Embrace, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
843, 893-94 (2014) (discussing how minority shareholders may benefit when a controller 
“loots” other stakeholders). 
27 Note that I do not argue that the net effect of tunneling on public shareholders is positive.  
What I explain is the possibility that public shareholders could—indirectly and 
inadvertently—benefit from tunneling to some extent, which has been largely ignored in 
discussing corporate governance issues.     
28 Accordingly, a CMS controller, if he or she wishes to be a repeat player, would not 
choose an over-reaching level of tunneling.  See generally Sang Yop Kang, “Generous 
Thieves”:  The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder Arrangements in Bad-Law Jurisdictions, 
SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2305645 (explaining 
that a controlling shareholder tends to generously expropriate other investors when she/he 
is a repeat player).          
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4
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tunneling, CMS, and (quasi) monopoly—will be likely to apply to 
controlling family shareholders in China.              
Next, in the context of shareholder primacy, let us theoretically 
examine Chinese SOEs, particularly those who are (quasi) monopolies in 
the domestic market (or a local market).
29
  Two implications are 
noteworthy.
30
  First, as opposed to common sense, the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm—if implemented without reforming the established 
(quasi) monopoly of SOEs—could be counterproductive to China.  This is 
because the norm will encourage the managers of SOEs to reduce the 
quantity of a good or service and to charge a higher price in China.  These 




Second, in Chinese SOEs supplying goods or services 
predominantly for domestic consumers, it is possible that the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm would also be harmful to the (ultimate) 
shareholders.  Formally, the controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs is 
the party-state (or the government).  However, the state is a primary agent 
of the citizens of China, who are indeed the “ultimate shareholders.”
32
  
Thus, at least in theory, the citizens of China collectively (and indirectly) 
own an SOE, particularly when the party-state holds 100% (or a high 
percentage) of ownership.  Meanwhile, the citizens of China are, roughly 
speaking, the same as the consumer group of SOEs doing business in the 
domestic market.  At a glance, it seems that a corporate policy based on 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm will enhance the level of 
profits in favor of the “ultimate shareholders.”  However, these profits are 
transferred from the consumer group, which is actually the group of 
“ultimate shareholders.”  Thus, the transfer takes place simply from the 
right pocket to the left pocket.  A more systemic problem is that, during 
the course of the wealth transfer, a large amount of welfare will disappear 
                                                 
29 See infra Part IV (explaining negative potential outcomes that the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm brings in Chinese SOEs).  
30 These implications might also apply to similarly situated SOEs in other countries.  Note, 
however, that these implications are more meaningful to China, since China is officially a 
communist economy where SOEs play a key role.  See infra Part IV. 
31 For the same reasons, it is possible that there will be similar unintended (undesirable) 
consequences if a stock option arrangement—designed to align the managers’ incentive 
with shareholder wealth—is widely adopted in these SOEs.  Since a stock option is a 
vehicle that incentivizes SOE managers to attempt to maximize monopoly rents, it is 
possible in China that a stock option can generate a great deal of DWL and hurt domestic 
consumers, the citizens of China, who are “ultimate shareholders” of SOEs.  For the 
concept of “ultimate shareholders” of SOEs, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.  
Currently, I am conducting an independent research project to explore these issues related 
to stock options in China.   
32 For a similar view, see Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 
14 CHINA ECON. REV. 494, 499 (describing the citizens of China as “the ultimate 
theoretical principal in the case of state ownership”).            
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in the form of DWL.  Consequently, when shareholder wealth 
maximization applies to Chinese SOEs playing in industries for domestic 
demand, the net worth of “ultimate shareholders” will be lowered. 
This Article is organized as follows.  Part II introduces the 
concepts of (quasi) monopoly and shareholder wealth maximization, 
Roe’s insight into those concepts, and the three factors (i.e., CMS, 
tunneling, and Chinese SOEs) that Roe did not emphasize.  Part III 
explores intricately inter-related issues—such as CMS, tunneling, a 
controller’s weak incentive to follow profit maximization, investor 
protection, and social welfare—in the context of the tension between 
monopoly and shareholder primacy.  Part IV covers separate topics from 
Part III.
33
  Regarding the tension, Part IV explores the relationship in 
China among SOEs, the government, and the citizens of China.  Part V 
summarizes and concludes.  
                           
II. TENSION BETWEEN MONOPOLY AND SHAREHOLDER 
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
This Part begins with theories on shareholder wealth 
maximization and monopoly.  Subsequently, it covers both the insight and 
missing factors from Roe’s article.  A fundamental tension between 
(quasi) monopoly and shareholder wealth maximization will be 
emphasized. 
   
A. Shareholder Wealth Maximization  
According to U.S. corporate governance scholarship, the primary 
aim of a corporation is to maximize shareholder value.
34
  Basically, 
shareholder wealth maximization is rooted in the fundamental belief that 
corporate agents’ fiduciary duties should be discharged for shareholders as 




1. Shareholder Primacy Norm in the United States  
In the United States, the shareholder wealth maximization 
principle was pronounced in the famous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Company.
36
  Henry Ford, the majority shareholder of Ford Motor 
                                                 
33 Part IV does not explore issues related to CMS and tunneling. 
34  See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 45 (“This principle [of shareholder wealth 
maximization] is well-established in U.S. corporate law.”).   
35 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. 
Ch. 1938)).     
36 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  Dodge is often considered the 
leading case on shareholder primacy in the United States.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 
574-75 (2002) (explaining Dodge in the context of shareholder wealth maximization).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4
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Company—a very lucrative business—reinvested earnings, lowered prices 
for consumers, and enhanced working conditions for employees.
37
  The 
Dodge brothers, minority shareholders of Ford Motor Company, brought 
suit and demanded that the company pay more dividends.
38
  Ford defended 
his policy of withholding profits inside the company, based on his belief 
of the corporation as a public good.  For instance, he testified that his 
“ambition” was to make employees better off.
39
  Ford’s altruism for 
consumers was also pointed out in the case:  “[Mr. Ford] thinks the Ford 
Motor Company . . . has had too large profits, and that, although large 
profits might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, by 
reducing the price of the output of the company, ought to be 
undertaken.”
40
  Emphasizing that the primary goal of a corporation is to 
make profits for stockholders,
41
 the Court articulated that “[t]he discretion 
of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or 
to the non[-]distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote 
them to other purposes.”
42
  The Court ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers.     
The spirit of shareholder primacy is also well preserved in the 
current case law in Delaware, the center of modern United States 
corporate law.
43
  For instance, Judge Leo Strine explained that “our 
corporate law (and that of most of our nation) expects that the directors of 
a solvent firm will cause the firm to undertake economic activities that 
maximize the value of the firm’s cash flows primarily for the benefit of 
the residual risk-bearers, the owners of the firm’s equity capital.”
44
 
(emphasis added).  Traditionally, shareholders are considered the “owners” 
of a corporation.
45
  If so, the idea of maximizing net benefits for a 
corporation’s owners is easily justified.  Even if shareholders are not 
                                                                                                               
Some scholars are, however, critical of the implications of Dodge.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, 
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008).        
37 See Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 574-75. 
38 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 36, at 164-65 (providing a further explanation of the case); 
see also Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 574-75.      
39 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
40 Id. at 683-84. 
41 Id. at 684 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders.”). 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 490 (explaining how the center of the 
modern U.S. corporate law changed from New Jersey to Delaware).     
44 Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc. 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (citing Roe, supra note 12).  
45See, e.g., Shareholder Rights: Power to the Owners, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573121-activist-shareholders-are-right-mount-
barricades-politicians-are-wrong-cap (explaining the notion of shareholders as owners of a 
company in a context of shareholder activism).  
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precisely the “owners” of a corporation,
46
 the notion of shareholders as 
“residual claimants” buttresses the principle of shareholder wealth 
maximization.  This theory posits that shareholder wealth maximization is 
optimal in a corporation, since other constituencies of a corporation (such 
as employees, suppliers, creditors, and even the government
47
) already 
receive their cash flows before the shareholders do.
48
  As a result, 
shareholder wealth maximization, as long as it is achieved in a proper 
manner with fair treatment and protection of other constituencies,
 49
 





2. Shareholder Primacy Norm Outside the United States   
Outside the United States, many jurisdictions have started to 
seriously consider the notion of shareholder protection.  For instance, 
Korea has made a series of corporate law reforms since the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997.  In general, the direction of these reforms has been 
consistent with the shareholder primacy norm.
51
  In Korea, shareholder 
derivative suits have been raised—though the frequency is less than that of 
the United States, (perhaps) the most active jurisdiction in the world—
                                                 
46 There are commentators who explain that shareholders are not owners of a corporation.  
See, e.g., Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 733, 754 (2007) (“Shareholders do not ‘own’ corporations.  They own securities—
shares of stock—which entitle them to very limited electoral rights and the right to share in 
the financial returns produced by the corporation’s business operations.”); see also 
Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 551 (introducing a similar view).    
47 The government receives cash flows from a corporation in the form of corporate taxes, 
before shareholders receive cash flows such as dividends. 
48  Recall that shareholders are residual claimants of a corporation, but note that this 
argument can be weakened when other constituencies are not properly protected.  See 
Production Resources Group, 863 A.2d at 787 (explaining shareholder wealth 
maximization based on the assumption that creditors are already protected by contractual 
agreements, the law of fraudulent conveyance, and federal bankruptcy law).        
49 See Roe, supra note 12, at 2065 (“In the long run, the argument goes, employees and 
other stakeholders are overall better off with fluid and efficient capital markets, managers 
need a simple metric to follow, and both wealth and, in the end, fairness are maximized by 
shareholders being the corporation’s residual beneficiary, with the other claimants getting 
what they want via contract with the corporation.”).     
50 As to the concept of Pareto efficiency, see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 598 
(“In a Pareto efficient allocation of goods, no one can be made better off without making 
someone else worse off.”).  
51 In addition to voluntary reforms inside Korea, such a significant alteration is partly due 
to external influence from the international community and creditor institutions.  See, e.g., 
Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and 
Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 61, 62 (1999) (“The 
process of reform was hastened by the foreign exchange crisis of 1997 and the 
consequential involvement of the international lending agencies such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the restructuring of Korean industries.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4
140 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW    Vol. 11 
 
since the first derivative suit case against the Korea First Bank in 1997.
52
  
In China, reforms have strengthened protection for shareholders although 
it did not experience a major financial crisis comparable to the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997.  For instance, the derivative suit system has 
gradually developed
53
 and the notion of independent directors has been 
emphasized in a significant manner.
54
        
In addition, shareholder activism—such as hedge funds’ 
aggressive investment and participation in the decision-making processes 
in corporations—in line with the shareholder wealth maximization norm is 
encouraged.
55
  To illustrate, a corporate governance dispute took place 
recently between Elliott Associates (hereinafter Elliott), a U.S. hedge fund, 
and Samsung Group, a large Korean corporate group in which the globally 
prestigious smart-phone and semi-conductor producer, Samsung 
Electronics, is an affiliated company.
56
  Samsung Group proceeded with a 
merger of Samsung C&T by Cheil Industries, a de facto holding company 
of the group.  Arguably, the main reason for the proposed merger was to 
strengthen the control of the current controlling shareholder of the Lee 
family, since Samsung C&T was a large shareholder of the group’s 
flagship company, Samsung Electronics.
57
  After it purchased 7.12% of 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Shareholder Suits and Outside Director Liability: The 
Case of Korea, 10 J. KOREAN L. 325, 344-45 (2010) (explaining the 1997 Korea First Bank 
case, the first derivative suit in Korea).  
53  See Hui Huang, The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 227, 229 (2007) (providing a further 
explanation of the derivative suit system in China); see also Hui Huang, Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis, 27 B.F.L.R. 
619, 622 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2140613.  See Sang Yop Kang, 
Taking Voting Leverage and Anti-Director Rights More Seriously: A Critical Analysis of 
the Law and Finance Theory, (Peking University School of Transnational Law Research 
Paper No. 15-3, 2015) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2669420 (providing a brief 
comparison of derivative suit systems in the United States, China, and Korea). 
54 See, e.g., Ling Zhou, The Independent Director System and Its Legal Transplant into 
China, 6 J. COMP. L. 262, 263 (2011) (“The ‘independent director’ is a vivid example of 
legal transplant into China’s post-Mao legal system.”).  
55 See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1729 (2008) (finding that “activist hedge funds in the United 
States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial 
success in two-thirds of the cases [from 2001 to 2006].”). 
56 See Corporate Governance in South Korea: Reconstructing Samsung, THE ECONOMIST 
(July 11, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21657377-bid-merge-two-
groups-companies-raises-wider-questions-reconstructing-samsung (explaining the planned 
mergers between Cheil Industries and Samsung C&T); see also Elliott Turns up Heat on 
Samsung over Merger Bid, YONHOP NEWS (June 18, 2015, 18:55), 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2015/06/18/0200000000AEN20150618001253320.h
tml.     
57  See Simon Mundy, Samsung’s Founding Family Strengthens Grip on Group, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES (July 17, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0f7b9934-2c3f-
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 Elliott became the third largest shareholder of 
the company.  Elliott contended that the proposed deal is “neither fair to 
nor in the best interests of Samsung C&T’s shareholders.”
59
  In response 
to this criticism, interestingly, Samsung Group also defended the deal 
based on the shareholder primacy norm, arguing that the merger will 
eventually create value for Samsung C&T shareholders due to the synergy 
with Cheil Industries’ business portfolio.
60
 
The issue of which party’s argument is more convincing—though 
it is important and intriguing in the corporate governance scholarship—is 
beyond the scope of this Article.
61
  What I emphasize here is that 
shareholder primacy and shareholder wealth maximization are standards 
that the arguments of both Elliott and Samsung Group are grounded upon.  
Indeed, in many countries outside the United States and the United 
Kingdom, shareholder primacy and shareholder wealth maximization are 
gradually accepted as the standard to measure the quality of corporate 
governance. 
               
B. (Quasi) Monopoly 
Let us set aside the issues of shareholder wealth maximization for 
a moment and consider (quasi) monopoly on a stand-alone basis.  For the 
sake of simplicity, take an example of a product market of a good.  
According to microeconomics theory on producer behavior, a 
corporation—if it is economically rational and attempts to maximize 
profits—determines the level of output (hereinafter Qm), where the 
marginal revenue (hereinafter MR)—namely, the increased revenue from 
producing one more unit—is equal to the marginal cost (hereinafter MC) 
namely, the increased cost of producing one more unit.
62
    
 
1. Maximizing Monopoly Profits, Consumer Surplus, 
Deadweight Loss, and Social Welfare    
                                                                                                               
11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7.html#axzz3rgQ1du00 (discussing “Samsung C&T’s 4 percent 
stake in Samsung Electronics”).     
58 Jungah Lee & Rose Kim, Activist Investor Elliott Starts ‘War’ on Samsung’s Lees, 
BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
06-03/elliott-says-cheil-takeover-of-samsung-c-t-undervalues-company-iaherbxb.   
59 Id.  A rumor spread that Samsung prepared the proposed merger as a way of sacrificing 
shareholder wealth, with the sole benefits going to the controlling family of the group.  See 
The ECONOMIST, supra note 56.  
60 Id.  
61 I am currently conducting further research on this issue in an independent project.   
62 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 292-93; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra 
note 3, at 27 (“the profit-maximizing output of the firm is shown at the point at which the 
marginal cost curve, labeled MC, and marginal revenue curve of the firm are equal.”).    
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This general principle of profit maximization (i.e., MR = MC) also 
applies to a monopoly corporation, when it rationally tries to maximize 
monopoly profits
63
 (see the following Figure 1).  At the point where MR 
equals MC, the monopolist determines the amount of monopoly-profit-
maximizing output (Qm) and, based on a demand curve that consumers 
face, charges the monopoly-profit-maximizing price (hereinafter Pm).
64
  
Pm is higher than the price determined in a competitive market 
(hereinafter Pc).
65
  For this reason, it is generally explained that a 
monopolist has the price-setting capacity, while a supplier in a competitive 
market is merely a price-taker.
66
  Qm is lower than the output level in a 
competitive market (Qc):
67
  in response to a higher price in a monopoly, 
consumers reduce their consumption.    
Although the combination of Pm and Qm is optimal to the 
monopolist, it lowers the level of consumer surplus.  Wealth transfers 
from the group of consumers to the monopolist (graphically, Rectangle A 
indicates the transfer in Figure 1).  There are fairness issues in regard to 
this wealth transfer—though the issues are more like a socio-political 
agenda.  For instance, “if consumers on average are poorer than producers 
(more precisely, than the owners of the producers),”
68
 such a transfer will 
exacerbate the discrepancy between the poor and the wealthy.
69
  From an 
efficiency standpoint, this type of wealth transfer is also problematic, 
since DWL, a net loss in an economy, is created in the course of the 
transfer.  Specifically, DWL can be divided into two parts: (1) surplus that 
consumers lose, since they reduce consumption at a higher monopoly 
                                                 
63 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 367-68 (explaining the output decision of a 
monopolist which tries to maximize profits).  
64 See infra Figure 1.  
65 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 385 (“In a competitive market, price equals 
marginal cost.  Monopoly power, on the other hand, implies that price exceeds marginal 
cost.”).  Mathematically, Pc = MC and Pm > MC.  Thus, Pm > Pc.   
66 Id. at 288 (explaining that “firms in perfectly competitive markets are price takers”).  But, 
note that it does not mean that a monopolist can set any price.  Id. at 366.  A monopoly 
company, if it tries to maximize profits, can set a price within the upper limit of Pm.  It can 
determine a price level, which is higher than Pm.  In that case, however, the level of profits 
will be lower than that at Pm, since the effect from a higher price would be outweighed by 
the opposite effect from the reduced quantity that consumers would consume.  See id.  
Meanwhile, [Pm – Pc] / Pc) is referred to as the Lerner Index.  ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. 
KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 104 (2nd ed. 2009) (explaining the Lerner Index as 
“[t]he most commonly used measure of monopoly power”).  In other words, when the 
difference between Pm and Pc, if it is divided by Pc, is large, a monopolist has strong 
market power.              
67 BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 66, at 37.  
68 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 285 (7th ed. 2007).    
69 This phenomenon also lowers the level of society’s utility.  Id. (“because of declining 
marginal utility of income, a dollar is worth more to the average consumer than to the 
average producer . . . even if there is no effect on output and therefore no deadweight 
loss.”).      
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price (Triangle B in Figure 1);
70
 and (2) surplus that the monopolist loses, 
since at the higher monopoly price, the monopolist is not able to sell a 
certain quantity of goods (Triangle C in Figure 1).
71
  As a result, the level 
of social welfare—the total sum of consumer surplus and producer 
surplus—in monopoly is lower than in a competitive market by DWL, 
namely Triangle B plus Triangle C.
72
 
   









2. Other Considerations    
A few points are worth noting further.  First, certain patterns of 
monopoly—such as a monopoly based on economies of scale (or scope),
73
 
or a monopoly that enhances innovation—could be efficient.
74
  For 
instance, economies of scale can generate a natural monopoly, “a firm that 
can produce the entire output of the market at a cost that is lower than 
                                                 
70 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 386. 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 29 (“Economies of scale are a condition of 
production in which the greater the level of output, the lower the average cost of 
production.”) (emphasis in the original text).   
74 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.   
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what it would be if there were several firms.”
75
  “[A natural monopoly] is 
more efficient to let it serve the entire market rather than have several 
firms compete.”
76
  However, this Article does not focus on analyzing such 
features.  Second, oligopoly—when only a few producers exercise 
dominant market power—would generate similar welfare problems (e.g., 
DWL), although the price-setting power of oligopolistic companies is less 
than that of the monopolist.
77
  Table 1 summarizes the general contours of 
monopoly, oligopoly, and a competitive market.   
Third, oligopoly—if it is defined by a number of existing 
competitors—is also the most common market structure in the United 
States.  It can be said, however, that the structure of U.S. oligopolies—for 
example, the markets for automobiles or smart phones—are markedly 
different from the structure of oligopolies in other countries.  The entry 
barriers of U.S. markets are low, so the U.S. product markets are quite 
open to domestic and foreign companies.  Accordingly, the extent of 
competition—not only from existing producers, but also from potential 
competitors ready to enter the U.S. markets—is high.  Thus, in the United 
States, the problem associated with exorbitant market power by a few 
oligopoly corporations is less serious.  For these reasons, the narrowly 
defined oligopoly in this Article—where there are a few established 
market players and those players exercise dominant market power without 
worrying very much over potential competition
78
—is more likely to be 
found in less developed countries than in the United States.                  
             
Table 1:  Price and Quantity of Industrial Organizations 
Generally, 
 Pm > Po > Pc 
 Qm < Qo < Qc 
 Wm < Wo < Wc  
 
Pm: price that maximizes monopoly profits 
Qm: quantity that maximizes monopoly profits 
Wm: social welfare under monopoly  
Po: price charged in an oligopoly market 
                                                 
75 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 388. 
76 Id.  
77 Under these circumstances, in general, an oligopoly price is higher than a competitive 
market price, but is lower than a monopoly price.  Also, in general, the level of output 
available in oligopoly is higher than that in monopoly, but is lower than that in a 
competitive market.  An oligopoly price is not always higher than a competitive market 
price, however, if producers in oligopoly face fierce price competition.  However, this 
Article focuses only on oligopoly where established companies exercise significant market 
power.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
78 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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Qo: quantity produced in an oligopoly market 
Wo: social welfare under oligopoly 
Pc: price charged in a competitive market 
Qc: quantity produced in a competitive market 
Wc: social welfare under a competitive market 
 
C. Tension Between (Quasi) Monopoly and Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization 
Recently, corporate law scholars, economists, policy-makers, and 
judiciaries outside the United States have often emphasized legal reforms 
based on arguments in line with shareholder primacy.  When such 
jurisdictions (particularly developing countries) import the Anglo-
American corporate governance ideology, an unconsidered potential risk 
is that the shareholder wealth maximization norm may be incompatible 
with the country’s underlying legal and market infrastructures. 
In this light, Roe’s argument is of significance.  In terms of social 
efficiency, Roe pointed out that shareholder primacy would create 
undesirable consequences.
79
  Since Roe compared the United States and 
Europe, his argument can be understood in the following way:  in the 
United States where product markets were competitive,
80
 shareholder 
wealth maximization would be beneficial to the domestic economy, but in 
Europe where product markets were less competitive, it is possible that 
shareholder wealth maximization would not be beneficial to society.
81
  
Roe’s analysis can be further developed and applied to emerging countries, 
where (quasi) monopoly is a dominant market structure.  It is noteworthy, 
however, that Roe pointed out a potentially negative effect of shareholder 
primacy on welfare at the national level.  Roe did not refute that 
shareholder wealth maximization is beneficial to shareholders.  In this 
light, an argument of this Article—explained in Part IV—is novel and 
intriguing:  for Chinese SOEs that are wholly (or substantially) owned by 
the government and that have (quasi) monopolistic power in domestic 
markets, there is a high chance that the shareholder wealth maximization 
                                                 
79 See Roe, supra note 12, at 2063.   
80 In general, even a market with a small number of competitors in the United States is 
exposed to the high level of competition.  See supra Part II.B.2.    
81 See Roe, supra note 12, at 2063; see also supra note 12.  In regard to Roe’s analysis, one 
may argue that as the European market has been further integrated, it is probable that the 
level of market competition in the United States and the Europe will be converged.  The 
European market is, however, not fully integrated as one unified economy like the United 
States.  The recent debate on possible exit of Greece and the United Kingdom from the 
Eurozone or the European Union (“Grexit” and “Brexit”) is evidentiary.    
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norm will bring negative impacts on the (ultimate) shareholders, not to 
mention on national welfare.
82
 
The recent case of Korea Electricity Power Corporation (KEPCO), 
the monopoly supplier of electricity in Korea, provides a good example of 
the conflict between the shareholder primacy norm and (quasi) monopoly 
regulation.  When determining a price, management of KEPCO discusses 
it with the Korean government, which considers the price of electricity as 
a factor of macro-economic policy in inflation and the general price level.  
Conventionally, the price of electricity has been set at a low level.  
Although KEPCO was discontent with the government’s low pricing 
policy, the government’s guidelines on pricing generally prevailed.  In 
2011, a group of minority shareholders brought a derivative suit against 
the then-CEO Ssang-Su Kim for damages of approximately 2.4 billion 
dollars, accusing the management of KEPCO of abandoning shareholder 
wealth by sticking to the government’s policy.
83
  Eventually, the court 
opined that such a business practice—after consultation with the 
government, which was concerned about inflationary pressure—was 
lawful.
84
  Although Mr. Kim won, according to reports, he personally had 
to bear huge legal costs to defend this case.
85
  This story indicates that the 
tension between monopoly (or oligopoly) regulation and the shareholder 
primacy norm is not only a potential issue, but an issue that could be 
realized in corporate litigation.  This case gives similar implications to 
China in the future, if shareholder primacy is aggressively accepted and a 
derivative suit system is further developed.  
                   
D. Factors Uncovered by Roe  
                                                 
82 See infra Part IV.     
83 See, e.g., Sejin Jeong (정세진), Toeim 1 ju namatda, Hanjeon Kim Ssang-Su sajang 2 jo 
8000 eok sonbaeso danghaetda (퇴임 1 주 남았다, 한전 김쌍수 사장 2 조 8000 억 
손배소 당했다) [One Week from Retirement, KEPCO CEO Ssang-Su Kim Sued for 
Damages of 2.8 Trillion Won], DONG-A ILBO (Aug. 20, 2011, 03:00), 
http://news.donga.com/3/all/20110820/39667624/1.  KEPCO minority shareholders also 
brought a related suit against the Korean government for its allegedly wrongful 
intervention when determining the price of electricity, but the government won.  See, e.g., 
Sang-Hoon Jin (진상훈), Hanjeon soaekjuju, gookga sangdae 7 jowondae 
sonhaebaesangsosong paeso (한전 소액주주, 국가 상대 7 조원대 손해배상소송 패소) 
[KEPCO Minority Shareholders Lost the 7 Trillion-Won Case Against the Government], 
CHOSUN BIZ (Oct. 5, 2012, 11:23), 
http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/10/05/2012100501200.html.     
84 See Jin, supra note 83.  
85 It was expected that his legal expenses would be a few million dollars, which possibly 
would not be covered by the corporation.  See Jeong, supra note 83.  
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Roe’s argument is insightful.  Based on his seminal work, 
however, there are many important and timely issues that could have been 
explored further.  For example, his analytical framework did not include 
CMS, where a controlling shareholder holds a minority economic interest 
in the controlled corporation.
86
  This seemingly odd ownership structure is, 
however, used in many jurisdictions.  Voting leverage devices—such as 
stock pyramiding, dual-class equity structures, and cross shareholding—
make CMS available.
87
  Due to its peculiar feature of a disproportionate 
relation between cash flow rights and voting rights, CMS—when it is 
combined with (quasi) monopoly—potentially creates interesting 
phenomena in the context of shareholder wealth maximization.  Part III 
explores the combined effects from CMS, a CMS controller’s incentive, 
tunneling, (quasi) monopoly, and shareholder primacy.   
Also, Roe’s original research on shareholder primacy did not 
cover the Chinese economy.  The dual-role of Chinese SOEs, as public 
entities as well as corporations, is a critical topic in the analysis of the 
tension between (quasi) monopoly and shareholder wealth maximization.  
Part IV provides a series of novel and counter-intuitive explanations 
regarding the situation in Chinese SOEs analyzing the impact of national 
welfare, consumers, and shareholders. 
           
III. CONTROLLING MINORITY STRUCTURE:  (QUASI) 
MONOPOLY, TUNNELING, AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
MAXIMIZATION 
This Part explores CMS economies in the context of (quasi) 
monopoly and shareholder primacy. Compared to the United States, the 
industrial organization of CMS-based economies (particularly developing 
countries) tends to be more monopolistic, with economic power 
concentrated in large business entities.
88
  As discussed, an economically 
rational monopoly “corporation” is assumed to make a decision in order to 
maximize monopoly profits.
89
  Note, however, that a corporation is a 
fictional person created by law.
90
  Although it is legally assumed that 
business decisions are made by a “corporation” (monopolist in this 
                                                 
86 CMS is one of the most significant factors in analyzing economies dominated by large 
corporate groups.      
87 See generally, Bebchuk et al., supra note 13.  
88  The United States has long been considered a representative free market economy, 
encouraging competition in society.  See, e.g., Standard Oil Co v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 
(1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of 
competition.”). 
89  See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 63 and accompanying text.   
90 A similar issue, in different circumstances and for a different research question, was 
raised in another article.  See Kang, supra note 26, at 863-66 (analyzing Gilson’s riddles 
and the product market-based account).   
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A. Controlling Minority Structure and Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization   
A CMS controller, by definition, has minority ownership in a 
corporation (e.g., 5%), while the controller wields a majority of voting 
rights (e.g., 51%).  As explained below, a CMS controller has a weak 
incentive to choose the profit maximization point. 
                       
1. CMS Controller’s Low Level of Economic Interests  
CSM-based business organizations are found in the United States 
as well as in Asia and Europe.  In 2014, in the four largest corporate 
groups in Korea, controlling shareholders and their families held, on 
average, 0.9% and 1.2% ownership respectively.
92
  In the same year, the 
internal ownership—including controlling families’ indirect ownership 
through affiliates as well as their direct ownership—of these corporate 
groups accounted for 48.3%.
93
  As a result, these families effectively 
exercised control over corporate groups.  The Wallenberg family in 
Sweden is also famous for a huge discrepancy between their economic 
interests (or cash flow rights) and voting rights:  for example, “the 
Wallenbergs have voting control over ABB [i.e., Sweden’s fourth largest 
firm by market capitalization], but actually have a cash flow rights stake 
of only about 5 percent.”
94
   
In the United States, “[Mark] Zuckerberg owns 28.4 percent of 
Facebook, the largest single stake in the company, and he extended his 
voting power by implementing a dual-class stock structure in 2009.”
95
  
                                                 
91 In the United States, decision-makers of a corporation are formally directors on the 
board of directors.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014) (“The business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction 
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation.”).     
92  See Nansulhun Choi & Sang Yop Kang, Competition Law Meets Corporate 
Governance:  Ownership Structure, Voting Leverage, and Investor Protection of Large 
Family Corporate Groups in Korea, 2 PEKING U. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 411, 422 (2014) 
(presenting data from the Korea Fair Trade Commission).  
93 Id.  The average internal ownership of the next six largest corporate groups accounted 
for 59.2%.  Id.      
94 Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 657, 665 (2005) (citing Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership 
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999)).  
95 Mark Zuckerberg:  How Much Does He Make and What Does He Stand to Gain from 
IPO?, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/mark-zuckerberg-how-much-does-he-
make-and-what-does-he-stand-to-gain-from-ipo/2012/02/02/gIQAhJBElQ_story.html.     
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Due to voting leverage giving “[him] shares with 10 times more voting 
power than common stock,” however, “[h]is command of the company 
goes beyond stock—[Zuckerberg] controls 56.9 percent of the voting 
power.”
96
   
In China, Alibaba provides a good example of CMS.  Before its 
initial public offering (IPO) in 2014, the largest shareholder of Alibaba 
was a Japanese corporation, Softbank, which owned 34.4%, followed by 
Yahoo which owned 22.6%.
97
  The ownership of Jack Ma was merely 
8.9%.
98
  Nonetheless, Alibaba’s controlling shareholder was Jack Ma.  
Irrespective of economic interests, he used a partnership that had the 
power to nominate a majority of the members of the board.
99
  When 
Alibaba planned to list in a stock exchange, the Hong Kong stock 
exchange was a primary candidate.  However, the Hong Kong stock 
exchange would not allow Alibaba to use a control device that was 
functionally equivalent to a one-share-multiple-vote mechanism.
100
  
Finally, Jack Ma and his partners chose to list Alibaba on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) where voting leverage was permitted.
101
 
Indeed, CMS is a useful ownership mechanism for controlling 
shareholders since they can exercise control over corporations with only a 
small fraction of their direct ownership.  In this light, it is expected that 
controlling family shareholders of large Chinese companies (or corporate 
groups) will have a stronger incentive to rely on CMS and use voting 
leverage devices such as stock pyramiding. 
                
 
2. Renunciation of Monopoly Profit Maximization:  Investors’ 
Loss and Consumers’ Benefit  
                                                 
96 Id.  
97 See, e.g., Paul Hodgson, Alibaba IPO:  Shareholders Can Buy Shares, Not Influence, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 18, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/18/alibaba-ipo-
shareholders; see also Joseph Tsai: Alibaba’s Mega-Dealmaker, SHENZHEN DAILY (Sept. 
19, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://www.szdaily.com/content/2014-09/19/content_10176909.htm.     
98 See Hodgson, supra note 97; see also SHENZHEN DAILY, supra note 97.  According to 
recent reports, Jack Ma’s ownership was 7.6% (as of August 2015).  See, e.g., Gillian 
Wong, Alibaba’s Jack Ma, Joe Tsai to Borrow $2 Billion Against Shares, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Sep. 4, 2015, 4:32 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibabas-jack-ma-
joe-tsai-to-borrow-2-billion-against-shares-1441355553.    
99  Alibaba Partnership, ALIBABA GROUP, http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ir/ 
governance_9 (last visited Aug. 3, 2015) (explaining the Alibaba partnership’s “director 
nomination right”).     
100 See, e.g., Enda Curran, How Hong Kong Lost the Alibaba IPO, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Mar. 15, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240 
52702303546204579440820673013810.    
101 See Nicole Bullock et al., Alibaba Closes at $93.89 in NYSE Debut, THE FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014,, 12:36 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8150f416-4002-11e4-
a381-00144feabdc0.html#slide0. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4
150 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW    Vol. 11 
 
Since a controlling shareholder’s ownership (or cash flow rights) 
is small in a CMS, the controller’s personal economic interest is often not 
aligned with the corporation.  If a CMS controller owns only 5% of a 
corporation, without tunneling, the controller is entitled to merely 5% of 
the cash flow rights from dividends and market capital appreciation.
102
  
Consider such a case within the context of (quasi) monopoly.  Although a 
CMS controller’s economic interests are fractionally associated with the 
corporation’s economic interests, monopoly profits are beneficial to a 
CMS controller as well.  In general, a decision to maximize monopoly 
profits is optimal to a CMS controller.  Due to the small percentage of 
ownership, however, the CMS controller’s incentive to strictly follow the 
profit maximization strategy for the corporation can be weakened if there 
is an internal or external factor derailing an equilibrium of profit 
maximization.   
For instance, when a government drives monopoly regulations 
such as a price stabilization policy, a CMS (quasi) monopoly 
corporation—before it challenges the regulation in the media or the 
judiciary—is likely to voluntarily give up its strategy of monopoly profit 
maximization.  In addition, if a CMS controller is able to gain other types 
of large, personal benefits (either pecuniary or non-pecuniary), the 
controller has more reason not to maximize profits for the corporation.
103
  
Also, if a CMS controller has unique characteristics, personal philosophies 
(e.g., a corporation as a means of philanthropy, as seen in Dodge)
104
 or 
views, which are incompatible with the maximization of monopoly profits, 
the controlling shareholder would not actively pursue profits for the other 
shareholders.   
Other things being equal, a CMS controller’s tendency to deviate 
from monopoly profit maximization is further reinforced as a CMS 
controller’s economic interests in a corporation decrease.  In such a deep 
CMS, a CMS controller is likely to charge a lower price than Pm (i.e., the 
monopoly-profit maximizing price) and produce a larger quantity of a 
good than Qm (i.e., the monopoly-profit maximizing quantity of a good 
                                                 
102 Basically, shareholders have two types of rights in a corporation, i.e., cash flow rights 
and voting rights.  Cash flow rights are not simply the right to receive dividends.  Even if 
dividends are not paid, shareholders can realize their cash flow rights through stock price 
appreciation.  In other words, cash flow rights are any pecuniary benefit that shareholders 
are entitled to attain on a pro-rata basis.  Of course, in a bad-law jurisdiction, controlling 
shareholders expropriate from corporations (i.e., tunneling), taking more than their pro-rata 
cash flows.  As a result, in reality public shareholders are not able to enjoy some of their 
cash flow rights.     
103 Other benefits are either pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits. 
104 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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produced to maximize monopoly profits).  If so, public shareholders’ 
wealth in the corporation is not optimized.
105
   
Clearly, from the perspective of corporate governance, this is a 
minus factor.  In theory, a CMS controller’s lackluster approach with 
respect to shareholder primacy could amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, 
detrimental to shareholders.  In reality, however, in most cases, the 
deferential business judgment rule protects the CMS controller (and 
managers or directors).
106
  This is because it would be almost impossible 
for public shareholders to rebut the presumption of reasonable business 
judgment.  Indeed, Dodge is an exceptional case, where a majority 
shareholder is held liable for a corporation’s “undesirable” dividend policy, 
which is generally considered to be within a board’s discretion.  In Dodge, 
a primary reason for the Court’s ruling against the corporation’s business 
decision (i.e., a dividend payout policy) is that Henry Ford showed in a 
bold manner—rather than disguised—his intention to put public welfare 
(for consumers and employees) before shareholders’ economic interest.
107
  
Other than a case of an explicit violation of the fiduciary duty to 
                                                 
105 Most managers in a widely-held corporation in the United States have less economic 
interests in a corporation than a CMS controller.  Then, a related question is:  Do managers 
in a U.S. dispersed-shareholder corporation follow the shareholder primacy norm?  To my 
knowledge, there is no convincing empirical evidence to answer this question.  It is 
plausible, however, that the shareholder wealth maximization principle works at least 
better in the United States—although it does not work in a perfect manner—than in other 
countries.  This is because the United States has many corporate governance 
mechanisms—again, although they do not perfectly work—that rectify relatively well 
managers’ attempt to deviate from the shareholder wealth maximization principle.  These 
corporate governance mechanisms include, but are not limited to, a business culture that 
respects the shareholder primacy norm, stock option arrangements, the presence of 
influential institutional investors, shareholder activism, competitive and sophisticated 
capital and product markets, a developed disclosure system, relatively effective 
independent directors, and the presence of relatively active markets for corporate control.  
For instance, a stock option arrangement can possibly align the interest of top managers 
with the interest of public shareholders.  See, e.g., Roe, supra note 12, at 2075 (but also 
explaining the obstacles of implementing stock options in Europe).  On the other hand, for 
a critical view of a typical stock option mechanism in the United States, see generally 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 
30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) (critiquing existing executive pay arrangements and the 
corporate governance processes that produce them).  Also, given that the topic of this 
Article is related to the tension among monopoly/oligopoly, shareholder wealth 
maximization, and national welfare (with consumer surplus), one more aspect that should 
be kept in mind is that monopolistic rents are less problematic in the United States, which 
has perhaps the most competitive product markets in the world.  See supra Part II.B.2.             
106 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 227-28 (4th ed. 2012) (“The core idea [of the business judgment rule] is 
universal:  Courts should not second-guess good-faith decisions made by independent and 
disinterested directors.”).    
107  See id. at 272 (“Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is unique precisely because Mr. Ford 
announced that he was acting in the interests of nonshareholders.”); see also supra Part 
II.A.1.     
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shareholders, there is little chance for a corporate insider to lose.  
Accordingly, public shareholders would not be able to recover damages.  
In addition, even if public investors recover damages in rare cases, they 
are often subject to the so-called circularity problem in derivative suits:  a 
liable corporate insider is insured by director and officer insurance, for 
which the corporation (and thus, eventually shareholders) pays.
108
   
From the perspective of the efficiency of the entire nation, 
however, a corporate insider’s aberration from the best interests of the 
shareholders is a plus factor.  For instance, the level of consumer surplus 
will be enhanced relative to a case where maximizing monopoly profits is 
pursued.  Also, social welfare is improved, since the amount of DWL will 
decrease.  Consider both (quasi) monopoly and CMS on a stand-alone 
basis:  (quasi) monopoly is generally considered an undesirable form of 
industrial organization due to the welfare loss.  In addition, CMS is 
generally considered a problematic ownership structure, due to a 
controlling shareholder’s disproportionate decision-making power.  When 
these two negative aspects are combined—what I call the “square of a bad” 
(or “Bad
2
”)—ironically, a positive outcome for national welfare may arise. 
 
3. CMS Controller’s Collective Action Problem    
In corporate governance scholarship, a theory of a collective 
action problem is often used to explain a case where non-controlling 
shareholders have difficulties when challenging corporate insiders in a 
proxy fight.
109
  The key factor of the collective action problem is that—
from a viewpoint of a non-controlling shareholder who challenges in a 
corporation’s election (and voting)—the costs of the challenge will be 
concentrated on him or her while the benefits from the challenge will be 
shared with other shareholders (i.e., free-riders).
110
  In contrast to the 
traditional collective action problem non-controlling shareholders face in 
a proxy fight, this Subsection suggests another type of collective action 
problem that a CMS controller faces in relation to profit maximization in 
(quasi) monopoly.   
(Quasi) monopolistic rents enlarged by shareholder wealth 
maximization are problematic to consumers, government agencies, and the 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 887-88 (1999) (“Arguably, there is no utility for shareholders in suing 
corporate fiduciaries for damages when fiduciaries pay most of these damages using funds 
provided by shareholders.”).  
109 See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 371 (explaining the concept of a collective 
action problem in a context of corporation).   
110 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:  The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 821 (1992) (“[A] shareholder proponent bears most 
of the cost of a proxy campaign, but receives only a pro rata share of the gains from 
success, while other shareholders can free ride on her efforts.”).   
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general public.  As the ultimate decision-maker of a corporation, it is 
likely that a CMS controller who maximizes shareholder wealth would be 
personally subject to criticism or even (official or unofficial) punishment.  
If so, on the one hand, the costs—namely, criticism or (official or 
unofficial) punishment arising from the monopoly profit maximization—
fall mostly on the CMS controller.  On the other hand, the benefits from 
maximizing profits in monopoly or oligopoly will be shared with non-
controlling public shareholders who hold the vast majority of the 
economic interests in the corporation.  Again, the CMS controller’s 
fraction is small proportional to his or her ownership.  Taking into account 
the fact that the costs are concentrated but the benefits are dispersed, the 
CMS controller’s incentive to maximize monopoly profits would be 
weakened.  
                              
B. Deviation from Shareholder Wealth Maximization  
Previously, Section A provided general explanations for the lack 
of a CMS controller’s incentive to maximize monopoly profits.  Now, 
Section B explains, by introducing related accounts and examples, how a 
CMS controller deviates from shareholder wealth maximization.  
Specifically, Section B reviews a CMS controller’s preference of the size 
of a corporation over profitability, and his or her personal philosophy, 
which can potentially lower the profitability of a corporation.  This 
analysis also provides a useful foundation for predicting the behavior and 
business decisions of controlling family shareholders in China.  If 
controlling family shareholders in China use CMS more frequently, it is 
likely that they will pay less attention to shareholder primacy.   
             
1. CMS Controller’s Size Preference  
A CMS controller, depending on the cultural values of specific 
jurisdictions, may be more interested in size maximization than in profit 
maximization.  This is partly because a CMS controller is able to enjoy 
non-pecuniary benefits by running a large corporation.
111
  Ruling a 
corporation as a king is fun and exciting.  Controlling shareholders tend to 
expand corporate territory as much as possible, like Genghis Khan, raising 
                                                 
111  See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:  
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1664 (2006) 
(“[C]ontrol of a large company in a small economy may provide a desirable social status 
for the controlling family.”); see also George W. Dent, Jr., Unprofitable Mergers:  Toward 
a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1986) (“Corporate managers 
may seek growth of firm size rather than maximization of share price in order to justify 
better compensation and perquisites, to increase prestige, to expand opportunities for 
promotion, and, perhaps most importantly, to protect themselves from the discipline of the 
market.”); Kang, supra note 26, at 870-73 (explaining the concept of empire-building—i.e., 
increasing the size of a corporation—and non-pecuniary benefits).  
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their self-esteem, even if some level of pecuniary benefits is sacrificed.  In 
Korea, the President sometimes has meetings with business leaders.  In 
these meetings, the physical distance between the President’s seat and the 
business leaders’ generally depends on the asset size or sales of their 
corporate groups (rather than profitability).
112
  Business elites perceive the 
opportunity to talk and take a photo with the person in power as a 
measurement of their success.  In addition, the size of a business is, at 
least sometimes, more significant than the level of profitability since a 
corporation’s size provides negotiating and political power.          
It is significant that while pecuniary benefits from (quasi) 
monopoly profits accrue to a CMS controller on a pro-rata basis (e.g., 
5%), non-pecuniary benefits belong to him or her almost exclusively.
113
  
Thus, the non-pecuniary benefits from managing a large business 
enterprise as a corporate dictatorship are private benefits that only the 
CMS controller, despite his or her fractional ownership, can enjoy.
114
  In 
reality, CMS controllers do not choose solely on the basis of size 
maximization or profit maximization.
115
  Rather, they compromise 
between these two poles.  In any case, the pure profit maximization 
strategy is not selected. 
In addition, the large size of a corporation provides the 
corporation with a variety of opportunities.  For instance, large 
corporations, particularly in developing countries where capital markets 
are not developed, have a comparative advantage in raising capital (either 
equity or debt), entering into a new regulatory industry, and obtaining a 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., Yoon-Joo Lee (이윤주) et al., Gwonryeokja yeopjarineun ‘himui seoyeol’ . . . 
Junkyungryun hoejangboda jaegye sunwiro (권력자 옆자리는 ‘힘의 서열’ . . . 전경련 
회장보다 재계 순위로) [Seat Next to President Chosen by ‘Ranks of Power’ . . . Given to 
Person with Biggest Market Capitalization Not President of Federation of Korean 
Industries], THE KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (May 19, 2014, 9:22 PM), 
http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201405191520161&code=920509&med=
khan (explaining that the power of business entities, including banks, is generally 
measured by their asset size).    
113 See, e.g., Kang, supra note 26, at 876 (describing a controlling shareholder as the 
beneficiary of non-pecuniary benefits).    
114  Id.  In the example of “sitting next to the President,” it can be said that public 
shareholders indirectly benefit from a controlling shareholder’s attempt to enlarge the size 
of a business entity.  This is because media attention brought to a large business entity 
could strengthen confidence for the business in both a product market and a capital market.       
115 Under the size maximization case, it is known that the quantity of a good is determined 
where the total revenue (TR) is equal to the total cost (TC).  Compare with the profit 
maximization case, where the quantity of a good is determined where the marginal revenue 
(MR) is equal to the marginal cost (MC).  
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“survival insurance” because they are “too-large-to-fail.”
116
  If these 
benefits go directly to corporations rather than controlling shareholders, 
benefits are shared with—though not necessarily on a pro-rata basis—
public shareholders.                                     
When a CMS controller pays attention to the size of the 
corporation and deviates from the pure shareholder wealth maximization 
norm, the controller decides to increase the quantity of a good produced 
by a monopoly corporation from Qm towards Qc
117
 (thus, the final 
quantity would be Qs which is situated between Qm and Qc).  The 
economic interests of public shareholders will be damaged because the 
monopoly profits raised by market power will shrink.
118
  On the other 
hand, for the same reason, the amount of consumer surplus will be 
enlarged.  The overall level of welfare for a domestic economy would be 
enhanced as DWL diminishes.
119





 a CMS with (quasi) monopoly might generate a better 
consequence—the combination of a high level of output and low price—
for consumers and society.
121
 
Of course, it does not say that the “square of a bad” is optimal in 
absolute terms.  Given the (quasi) monopoly, for instance, the quality of a 
good or service will not be improved due to the lack of meaningful 
competition in a market.  X-inefficiency
122
 and other problems associated 
with CMS and monopoly (e.g., business-politics collusion) also should be 
recognized.
123
  In particular, corporate insiders’ shirking usually takes 
place in a (quasi) monopoly.  In this respect, the positive aspect of the 
“square of a bad” merely indicates that the situation is “better than we had 
thought” in relative terms.  This limited interpretation of the “square of a 
bad” is useful to examine the current and future markets in China. 
 
2. Controlling Shareholder’s Personal Philosophy  
A business tycoon’s personal philosophy may also negatively 
affect shareholder wealth maximization.  As discussed previously,
124
 
                                                 
116 Many scholars analyze the phenomenon of “too-large-to-fail” in a context of financial 
institutions and corporations.  See, e.g., Kang, supra note 26 at 880-81 (explaining too-
large-to-fail as a form of insurance).   
117 As explained earlier, Qm stands for the quantity produced by a monopoly corporation 
when it follows monopoly profits maximization.  Qc stands for the quantity produced in a 
competitive market.     
118 It is also useful to analyze this phenomenon based on supra Figure 1.    
119 See id. 
120 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining the “square of a bad” (or “Bad2”)).  
121 Note that this explanation is based on “no-tunneling.”  As to a further analysis with 
tunneling, see infra Part III.C.    
122 See infra note 156 and accompanying text.   
123 See infra Part III.D. 
124 See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining Dodge). 
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Henry Ford’s philosophy of philanthropy for employees, consumers, and 
society is exemplary.
125
  Almost a century later, intriguingly, Alibaba’s 
Jack Ma introduced a unique business philosophy similar to Henry 
Ford’s.
126
  In a letter to employees before the company’s IPO, Jack Ma 
confirmed that Alibaba believed in the principle of “customer first, 
employee second, shareholder third”:
127
 
In a few minutes we will officially submit our initial 
registration statement to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. This means Alibaba is about to enter a new 
era of challenges . . . After we go public, we would 
continue to adhere to the principle of “customer first, 
employee second, shareholder third.”  We believe that, no 
matter what difficult decisions we face whether now or in 
the future, sticking with our principles is the best way to 
respect and protect the interests of all parties.
128
 (emphasis 
added).                
 
A few additional points about this letter are worth noting.  Most of 
all, this letter explicitly shows Jack Ma’s belief in “customer primacy,” as 
opposed to “shareholder primacy.”
129
  No matter whether “customers” 
refer to sellers or purchasers of the Alibaba platform, the letter may 
convey that Alibaba would give up maximizing profits belonging to 
shareholders.
130
  Since Jack Ma’s economic interest in Alibaba is less than 
                                                 
125 Note, however, that Henry Ford’s decision not to pay a sufficient level of dividends to 
shareholders (particularly the Dodge brothers) can be also explained by his business 
strategy rather than his philanthropy.  See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 106, at 271 (“In 1913, 
the Dodge brothers announced that they would stop building cars for Ford, and would 
design, build, and sell their own car . . .  In 1916, Ford announced that his company would 
stop paying dividends, in an attempt to cut off the cash flow that fueled his rivals’ 
business.”).   
126 Currently, I am considering an independent project in relation to Alibaba and investor 
protection.  This Section’s explanation of Alibaba is from the initial research for this 
project.   
127 See, e.g., ‘Unparalleled Ruthlessness’ Awaits:  Jack Ma’s Letter to Alibaba Employees, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (May 7, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/05/07/unparalleled-
ruthlessness-awaits-jack-mas-letter-to-alibaba-employees/ (introducing Jack Ma’s e-mail to 
Alibaba’s employees).    
128 See id (quoting Jack Ma’s e-mail to Alibaba’s employees).     
129  Alternatively, it is possible that the principle of “customer first, employee second, 
shareholder third” is merely Alibaba’s (or Jack Ma’s) general business slogan.  If so, the 
principle does not necessarily hurt the interest of shareholders in Alibaba, since it can be 
construed that the principle is merely a marketing phrase to attract customers.   
130 Since Alibaba is the largest e-commerce company in China, it is generally explained 
that Alibaba is a (quasi) monopolist with significant market power.  As to the Alibaba’s 
market share in China, see Adam Jourdan, Surviving Chairman Ma: Life in the Shadow of 
China’s Alibaba, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-ecommerce-idUSBRE9AP17H20131126 (“Alibaba accounts for half of online retail 
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 he bears a small percentage of the lost monopoly profits.  This 
opportunity cost is the price for realizing his personal belief.  I do not 
downplay Jack Ma’s sincere desire for philanthropy.  However, given his 
net-worth of 24.5 billion dollars,
132
 keeping faith in his business may be 
more valuable to him than additional pecuniary benefits.  It is possible that 
the “marginal utility”
133
 of pecuniary benefits—the additional satisfaction 
of an additional dollar—is tiny, or even close to zero at his level of wealth.            
Sometimes, corporate insiders maintain a business line closely 
related to their hobbies as a “pet project.”  This type of externalization is 
detrimental both to shareholders and society.  Compared to spending 
resources for a “pet project,” complying with a personal belief for 
“customer primacy” in Alibaba could be more desirable.  Nonetheless, 
more than 90% of the opportunity cost, in relation to the renunciation of 
maximized monopoly profits, will be borne by shareholders other than 
Jack Ma.  In this light, it is theoretically possible that public shareholders 
may bring a suit since shareholder wealth is a subordinate ideology to the 
welfare of customers and employees in Alibaba (the argument of 
shareholders would be based on Dodge to some extent).
134
 
                                                                                                               
sales through its Tmall online market while its eBay like Taobao also controls around 80 
percent of consumer to consumer online sales, according to data from consultancy 
Euromonitor . . .  By comparison, China’s second largest ecommerce firm Jingdong, or 
JD.com, has a nearly 13 percent market share.”); Kathy Chu & Gillian Wong, Alibaba vs. 
JD.com: Executives Weigh In, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 17, 2015, 2:45 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-vs-jd-com-executives-weigh-in-1439793927 
(“Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. remains the giant, capturing nearly 59% of China’s fast-
growing business-to-consumer marketplace . . .  JD.com’s share was 23% in the first 
quarter of 2015 . . . .”).  On the other hand, it might also be explained that Alibaba is not a 
firmly established (quasi) monopolist due to the competitive features of e-commerce (e.g., 
competition with Jingdong).  If so, Alibaba’s “customer first” policy can be explained by 
the potential competition in the market, as well as by Jack Ma’s personal philosophy for 
customers (and society). 
131 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that Jack Ma’s ownership before 
the IPO was 8.9% and his recent ownership as of August 2015 was 7.6%).   
132 See, e.g., Paul Carsten, Alibaba’s Jack Ma Dethroned as China’s Richest by Solar 
Magnate:  Report, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2015, 5:27 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/03/us-china-wealth-idUSKBN0L70WA20150203 
(stating that Jack Ma and his family’s personal wealth is $24.5 billion).  
133 Marginal utility is “the additional satisfaction or benefit (utility) that a consumer derives 
from buying an additional unit of a commodity or service.”  See BRITANNICA, 
http://global.britannica.com/topic/marginal-utility (last visited Aug. 6, 2015).  It is known 
that marginal utility diminishes.  See KRUGMAN & WELLS, supra note 6, at 252 (“each 
successive clam adds less to total utility than the previous clam.”).    
134 Alibaba may argue that its customer-friendly policy will be, in the long run, beneficial 
to shareholders.  See also supra note 129.  In practice, however, it would be difficult for 
public shareholders in the United States to bring suit against corporate insiders of Alibaba.  
It is partially because Alibaba is incorporated in Cayman Islands.  Presentation of 
Professor Jesse Fried at Harvard Law School (Seminar at Peking University Law School, 
Nov. 2, 2015).                  
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C. Tunneling and (Quasi) Monopoly Profits 
So far, Part III has explored a CMS controller’s incentive issues 
without considering tunneling.  Section C examines the impacts of 
tunneling on shareholder wealth maximization and on the welfare of 
shareholders, consumers, and the nation in a (quasi) monopoly 
environment.  In this analysis, three suboptimal aspects are combined:  (1) 
bad industrial organization (i.e., monopoly); (2) bad ownership structure 
(i.e., CMS); and (3) bad corporate law (i.e., tunneling).  I call this 
combination the “cube of a bad” (or “Bad
3
”).  The “cube of a bad” has 
implications for controlling family shareholders of large corporate groups, 
particularly in China where the quality of corporate governance is poor 
(and thus tunneling is not effectively kept in check).               
In regard to the extent of tunneling, three scenarios are considered 
in the following Subsections:  (1) Tunneling of Substantially All of 
Corporate Assets (e.g., tunneling of an additional 85%); (2) Small-Scale 
Tunneling (e.g., tunneling of an additional 3%); and (3) Significant Levels 
(But Not Substantially All) of Tunneling (e.g., tunneling of an additional 
25%).  In these scenarios, a hypothetical CMS controller holds a 5% 
economic interest in a corporation.  Since numerical examples of the level 
of tunneling (85%, 3%, and 25%) are selected merely for simplicity 
purposes, a more generalized model can be further developed and 
suggested.
135
   
           
1. Tunneling of Substantially All of Corporate Assets (e.g., 
Tunneling of an Additional 85%)  
Suppose that a CMS controller, holding a 5% of economic interest 
in a corporation, is able to expropriate 85% of corporate value in addition 
to justified 5% cash flows.  Such drastic plundering may take place in a 
severely tainted bad-law jurisdiction, either because corporate law in itself 
is imperfect or because the enforcement system—although the law-on-the-
book is perfect—is ineffective.
136
  Under these circumstances, the 
controller’s personal economic incentive—due to the combined effect of 
legitimate and unjustified cash flow rights—aligns almost exactly with 
                                                 
135 See infra Part III.D.  
136 See, e.g., Ronal J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries:  
Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (2007) (“The law and finance 
literature, exemplified by a series of articles by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny and others, treats the prevalence of controlling 
shareholders as the result of bad law.”).  However, Gilson explains that some controlling 
shareholder regimes are good-law countries.  Gilson, supra note 111, at 1645 (explaining 
that Sweden—a controlling shareholder regime—is a good-law country).        
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that of the corporation since the controller takes 90% of corporate value.
137
  
Accordingly, it is highly likely that the controller will pursue monopoly 
profit maximization.  A caveat from the CMS controller’s standpoint, 
however, is that in the next stage, public shareholders of the pillaged 
corporation would be highly reluctant to invest further and, thus, will 
leave the corporation.  For that reason, a CMS controller’s extensive 
tunneling is likely a one-time event.  A CMS controller, who wishes to 
remain as a repeat player, such as a controlling family shareholder who 
intends to stay in a corporation for a long time via inheritance, would not 
depend on massive tunneling.
138
   
Nevertheless, if massive tunneling occurs, the result will be the 
worst from both the aspects of shareholder primacy and social welfare:  
(1) the financial interests of public investors will be severely damaged; (2) 
due to public shareholders’ distrust in their investment in corporations, 
further development in a capital market is unlikely; (3) a large amount of 
consumer surplus will be transferred to a monopoly corporation, where the 
CMS controller takes 90% of economic interests; and (4) a gigantic 
amount of DWL would be created.  
           
2. Small-Scale Tunneling (e.g., Tunneling of an Additional 3%)  
Suppose that a CMS controller with 5% ownership in a monopoly 
corporation relies on a strategy of small-scale tunneling and takes an 
additional 3% of corporate value on top of the justified 5% cash flows.  
This scenario of modest tunneling by a controlling shareholder is a more 
realistic repeated-game arrangement in a bad-law jurisdiction if public 
investors and a controlling shareholder have a long time horizon.
139
  
Perhaps a controlling shareholder would like to rely on substantial 
plundering;  however, the controller might believe that substantial 
plundering is too risky in terms of legal repercussions and enforcement.  
Although the 3% level looks low in this scenario,
140
 the CMS controller’s 
                                                 
137 In this hypothetical example, a CMS controller’s legitimate cash flow rights are 5%, 
while unjustified cash flow rights are 85%.  Thus, the total cash flows are 90%.       
138  Thus, this scenario of massive tunneling is ruled out in a jurisdiction based on 
controlling family shareholders with corporate groups, except for a slim chance that public 
shareholders are still satisfied with the remaining profits.  Although it is a remote 
possibility, theoretically, it is possible that public shareholders with 95% cash flow rights 
are satisfied (though not perfectly satisfied) with 10% of actual cash flows.  In that case, 
they would remain in a corporation as public shareholders.   
139 This type of controlling shareholder is referred to as a “stationary controller” who 
periodically extracts a part of corporate value.  The other type of controlling shareholder is 
a “roving controller” who plunders the entire corporate value at once.  See generally Kang, 
supra note 28 (explaining a “stationary controller” and a “roving controller”).    
140 Note that I do not have in mind any specific controlling family shareholder who relies 
on 3% tunneling.  It is extremely difficult to understand the extent of tunneling, which 
usually takes place in secret.  3% is merely a numerical example in this hypothetical case. 
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“extra return” (i.e., 3% tunneling) on the “initial investment” (i.e., 5% 
cash flow rights) is huge (60%).
141
  The CMS controller with small-scale 
tunneling has still a weak incentive to pursue monopoly profit 
maximization, since the controller’s total cash flows are merely 8%.
142
  It 
is noteworthy, however, that a CMS controller with small-scale tunneling 
has a stronger incentive for profit maximization than a CMS controller 
without tunneling, whose justified cash flow rights account for 5% in a 
corporation.  To some extent, shareholder wealth maximization, ironically, 
can be supported by tunneling.      
An interesting and contradictory phenomenon emerges in the 
context of shareholder protection when a CMS controller relies on 
tunneling.  On the one hand, public shareholders are less protected, since a 
controller takes the public shareholders’ wealth reserved in a corporation.  
On the other hand, public shareholders may gain more economic benefits, 
due to the controller’s relatively stronger incentive to maximize monopoly 
profits.
143
  Thus, modest tunneling has a mixed impact on shareholders.  
Subsequently, consider the impact of the modest tunneling on social 
welfare relative to a situation with no tunneling.  Tunneling, even if it is 
modest, strengthens a CMS controller’s incentive to follow monopoly 
profit maximization.  Thus, the CMS controller will move up price 
towards Pm.  As a result, consumers will be worse off and the DWL will 
be larger.  This will lower the level of national welfare. 
Examine tunneling in China.  Some controlling shareholders 
expropriate substantially all of corporate assets.  For example, “[in 2001], 
the largest shareholder of Sanjiu Pharmacy extracted $301.9 million or 
96% of this listed company’s total equity.”
144
  As time goes by, corporate 
governance systems in China will stabilize and more controlling family 
shareholders, who intend to stay in their controlled corporations for a long 
time, will emerge as repeat players.
145
  Then, although it is difficult to 
entirely rule out tunneling of substantially all corporate assets, a modest 
level of extraction will be dominant in the future.  If so, this Subsection 
will provide a useful framework to analyze the interaction of (quasi) 
monopoly, CMS, and modest tunneling in China. 
                                                 
141  3% ÷ 5% = 0.6 (which is equivalent to 60% return-on-equity).  Accordingly, this 
situation is also attractive to the CMS controller.  
142 In this hypothetical example, a CMS controller’s original cash flow rights are 5%, while 
unjustified cash flow rights are 3%.  Thus, the total cash flows are 8%.       
143 It is noteworthy, however, that a CMS controller in this example has only 3% more 
economic incentives.  Accordingly, his or her incentive to follow shareholder primacy will 
be slightly strengthened.  As a result, benefits for public shareholders could be limited.  
Ultimately, how much public shareholders indirectly benefit from a controller’s tunneling 
is an empirical question.    
144 See Chong-En Bai et al., Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China, 32 J. 
COMP. ECON. 599, 600 (2004). 
145 See generally Kang, supra note 28 (explaining a stationary controller as a repeat player).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
2015]                                 TENSION BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY     161 
 
                
3. Significant Levels of Tunneling (e.g., Tunneling of an 
Additional 25%)  
If a CMS controller with 5% ownership of a monopoly 
corporation takes a significant amount, but not substantially all, of 
corporate value (e.g., taking 25% of corporate value beyond the justified 
5% of cash flows), the controller has more incentive to pursue monopoly 
profit maximization than a controller with tunneling of 3%.  As a result, 
price would increase further towards Pm and quantity would decrease 
towards Qm.  Again, the effect on shareholder protection is not 
straightforward.  On the one hand, the size of tunneling is significant and 
harms public shareholders.  On the other hand, when the CMS controller 
arduously pursues monopoly profits, public shareholders are likely to 
receive—at the expense of consumers—a significant portion of these 
profits, albeit on less than a pro-rata basis.
146
   
In light of this, it is difficult to label the public shareholders in a 
bad-law jurisdiction—though their cash flow rights are taken by a 
controlling shareholder—as “unilateral victims” due to the wealth transfer 
from consumers to all of the shareholders (public shareholders as well as a 
controller).
147
  If monopoly rents are generated due to an unduly high price 
charged by a monopoly corporation, it can be said that consumers are 
exploited by the corporation.  Public investors in the monopoly 
corporation benefit from the wealth transfer even if they do not actively 
participate in such “exploitation.”
148
  In different terms, public 
shareholders are on the same ship with the main exploiter—the monopoly 
corporation (or its controlling shareholder).  This analysis can also apply 
to controlling family shareholders in China if they use CMS in corporate 
groups and rely on significant (but not substantially all) level of tunneling, 
given (quasi) monopoly.     
One may point out that public shareholders obtain only 70% of 
monopoly profits while they are entitled to 95% of cash flow rights in a 
corporation.
149
  The logic may continue that public shareholders lose 25% 
of economic benefits
150
 and, thus, they are still victims.  However, if 
monopoly profits are “rents” in favor of the entire shareholder group (i.e., 
both a controller and public shareholders) to the detriment of consumers, it 
                                                 
146  Note that in this case, public shareholders own 95% of economic interests in the 
corporation.  Also, note that in this case, public shareholders end up with 70% of 
monopoly profits, since 25% of profits are taken by a controller’s tunneling (i.e., 95% – 
25% = 70%).   
147 See Kang, supra note 26, at 894.   
148 Sometimes, however, it is likely that public shareholders, as investors of a monopoly 
corporation, demand actively to charge the price (Pm) that maximizes monopoly profits.   
149 See supra note 146. 
150 95% − 70% = 25%.    
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can be said that public shareholders benefit 70% more, rather than lose 
25%.  In addition, whether it is 95:5 or 70:30 between public shareholders 
and a controller, the internal allocation of exploited resources within an 
exploiting entity does not matter from the standpoint of the consumers 
who are the ultimate victims in this case.
151
  Accordingly, consumers may 
feel that public shareholders—who may claim that they suffer from a 
controller’s tunneling—are merely weaker exploiters who capture rents 
that consumers could have benefitted from.   
 
4. Comparison of All Scenarios    
In Scenario 3 (tunneling of 25%), the controller has a greater 
incentive to maximize monopoly profits than a CMS controller in 
Scenario 2 (tunneling of 3%), but less incentive than a CMS controller in 
Scenario 1 (tunneling of 85%).  Thus, the monopoly price charged in 
Scenario 3 is likely to be in between the price in Scenario 1 (highest) and 
that in Scenario 2 (lowest).  However, recall that the price in Scenario 2 is 
likely to be higher than in the case where no tunneling takes place at all.  
Due to a CMS controller’s sufficient incentive to approach Pm and Qm in 
Scenario 3, the social welfare is damaged through a large amount of 
DWL:  DWL in Scenario 3 is larger than in Scenario 2, but smaller than in 
Scenario 1.  Table 2 summarizes the three scenarios discussed in this 
Section. 
       
Table 2:  Extent of Tunneling, Monopoly Profit Maximization, DWL, and 
Social Welfare 
 
SCENARIO 1        
(TUNNELING 
OF 85%) 
SCENARIO 2      
(TUNNELING 
OF 3%) 








Strong Weak Semi-Strong 
Price High Low In-between 
Quantity Small Amount Large Amount In-between 
DWL Large Small In-between 
                                                 
151 Monopoly rents will be distributed by the ratio of 95:5 (public shareholders v. a CMS 
controlling), if tunneling does not take place at all.  However, rents will be distributed by 
the ratio of 70:30 if tunneling of 25% applies.      
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Social Welfare Worst Best                     In-between 
D. Summary and Other Considerations 
Consider a simple, general model based on variables rather than 
specific numerical examples.  In this model, a CMS controlling 
shareholder’s cash flow rights (i.e., economic interests in a corporation) 
and the level of tunneling are denoted as “α” and “β,” respectively.  For 
example, when a CMS controller holding a 5% economic interest in a 
corporation does not rely on tunneling at all, α is 5% and β is 0%.  When 
the CMS controller takes an additional 25% of corporate value, α is 5% 
and β is 25%.
152
  A CMS controller’s total cash flows in a corporation, 
including tunneling, are calculated as “α plus β.”  Based on this general 
model, the analysis of Part III can be summarized by two cases:  the “case 
without tunneling” (i.e., β = 0, and thus the situation of good-law) and the 
“case with tunneling” (i.e., β > 0, and thus the situation of bad-law).     
First, consider the “case without tunneling.”  Since the value of β 
is zero, only the value of α matters.  Given (quasi) monopoly of a certain 
jurisdiction, as an average controller’s cash flow rights decrease (i.e., as 
the value of α becomes smaller), four outcomes are likely.  (1) The profit 
maximization norm is less likely to be pursued, since controllers with a 
smaller α (particularly deep CMS controllers) have a weaker incentive to 
maximize profits.  (2) Accordingly, public minority shareholders are likely 
to be worse off.  (3) It is likely, however, that DWL will be reduced, since 
corporations move away from monopoly-profit maximizing price and 
quantity.  As a result, social welfare will be improved.  (4) Also, the 
welfare of consumers will be enhanced, since controlling shareholders 
with a low level of economic interests have lukewarm incentive to 
maximize monopoly profits.   
Due to monopoly (i.e., bad industrial organization) and deep CMS 
(i.e., bad ownership structure), the case without tunneling is referred to as 




  Outcomes (1) and (2), which are 
related to investor protection, are easily understandable.  In contrast, 
outcomes (3) and (4), which are associated with efficiency and social 
welfare, are counter-intuitive to some extent.  This is because “positive” 
outcomes—the welfare of consumers and the nation as a whole is 
enhanced—arise, when two “negatives” are combined.  Sections A and B 
in this Part are basically explained based on the case without tunneling. 
Subsequently, examine the “case with tunneling” where the value 
of β is not zero.  Given monopoly in a jurisdiction, as an average CMS 
controller’s tunneling becomes more serious (as the value of β becomes 
larger), another four outcomes are likely.  (1) The profit maximization 
                                                 
152 See supra Part III.C.3. 
153 See supra Part III.A.2.   
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norm is more likely to be pursued, since the alignment of economic 
interests between CMS controllers and monopoly corporations is 
reinforced.
154
  (2) The welfare of public shareholders is affected in a 
mixed manner.  On the one hand, due to more serious tunneling (as the 
value of β becomes larger), public shareholders are likely to be worse off.  
On the other hand, the larger value of β provides CMS controllers with 
stronger incentive to pursue monopoly profit maximization, which ends up 
yielding more benefits to all of the shareholders.  (3) DWL is likely to be 
larger, since the corporation is going to move towards the monopoly-profit 
maximizing price and quantity.  Accordingly, national welfare would be 
harmed.
155
  (4) In addition, the level of consumer surplus would worsen, as 
the price close to Pm is chosen and wealth transfers from consumers to the 
monopoly corporation. 
Due to monopoly (i.e., bad industrial organization), deep CMS 
(i.e., bad ownership structure), and tunneling (i.e., bad corporate 
governance), the case with tunneling is referred to as “cube of a bad” (or 
“Bad
3
”).  In this case, outcomes (1) and (2) are, to some extent, counter-
intuitive.  In (1), interestingly, tunneling—despite its negative connotation 
in terms of investor protection—reinforces a CMS controller’s incentive to 
follow profit maximization, which is beneficial to public shareholders.  As 
a result, in (2) the damage caused by tunneling to public shareholders will 
be mitigated by enhanced shareholder wealth maximization.    
In sum, when CMS is combined with (quasi) monopoly and/or 
tunneling, positive outcomes may inadvertently arise.  Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting that this Article does not disagree with the classic, critical 
views of (quasi) monopoly, CMS, and tunneling.  Indeed, (quasi) 
monopolies generate many problems.  For instance, a corporation in a 
(quasi) monopoly market does not have to improve corporate efficiency 
due to the lack of competition.  Thus, a monopoly corporation’s internal 
inefficiency, such as “X-inefficiency,” may arise.
156
  In addition, when an 
active market for corporate control
157
 does not exist—which is true in 
many jurisdictions—it is extremely difficult to rectify corporate insiders’ 
slack in a monopoly corporation.  In other words, this type of monopolist 
is subject to virtually no external pressure from M&A and product markets.  
Also, CMS generally creates bad outcomes in corporate governance.  
                                                 
154 See, e.g., supra Table 2 and accompanying text. 
155 See id.     
156 See Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON. 
366, 366 (1983) (stating that given the lack of competition, X-inefficiency is measured by 
“the amount of slack in the system due to individuals’ not minimizing costs or being on 
their production possibility frontiers”).       
157  See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 842 (2001) (“[A]n active market for corporate 
control . . . can indirectly monitor performance and partly substitute for weaker direct 
shareholder oversight.”). 
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Particularly, when CMS is associated with tunneling, it has a huge 
negative effect on investor protection.  Moreover, it is problematic that 
CMS controllers—usually, a small number of business tycoons in a 
jurisdiction—are likely to have political connections with a government; 
they and their business associations often seek economic rents in an unfair 
manner.
158
   
These problems, however, are well known and already studied 
closely by economists, corporate law scholars, practitioners, and policy-
makers.  Thus, this Article, concurring with such general opinions, does 
not redundantly explain the same points.  Rather, this Article focuses on 
novel findings and analyses.  It is also noteworthy that this Article 
provides an analytical framework for CMS and/or tunneling, given that 
(quasi) monopoly is firmly established in a certain jurisdiction and, at least 
in the short or medium term, it is impractical to reform the jurisdiction’s 
imperfect industrial organization.  Under these circumstances, shareholder 
wealth maximization may result in unintended outcomes. 
                                                            
IV. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA:  (QUASI) 
MONOPOLY AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
Regarding the tension between shareholder maximization and 
(quasi) monopoly, Part III explored two factors—CMS and tunneling—
that Roe did not emphasize in his research.  Subsequently, Part IV 
theoretically examines the possible tension in the context of Chinese 
SOEs, another factor that Roe’s research does not cover.  Two points are 
worth noting in relation to the following analysis in Part IV.  First, the 
analysis focuses specifically on SOEs which are (quasi) monopolies in 
domestic markets.
159
  Second, although the theoretical approach in Part IV 
might also apply to similarly situated SOEs in other countries, China is 
perhaps the most important example of the analysis.  This is because 
China is, formally speaking, the largest communist economy—although it 
                                                 
158 It is generally explained that chaebols (large family corporate groups) in Korea and 
privately owned corporations in China have close connections with the government.  See 
Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators:  Lessons for 
Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 246 (2011) (“Chaebol structures still 
reflect their origins in the growth alliance with the [Chung-Hee] Park regime [in Korea].”); 
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership:  State Capitalism and the 
Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 669 (2015) (“[L]arge firms in China—whether [state-
owned enterprises], [privately owned enterprises], or ambiguous state-private blends—
survive and prosper precisely because they have fostered connections to state power and 
have succeeded in obtaining state-generated rents.”).      
159 In other words, Part IV does not cover Chinese SOEs, which do their main businesses in 
foreign markets.  Accordingly, consumers of SOEs in Part IV are generally the citizens of 
China.  In addition, Part IV analyzes mainly SOEs where the government holds a high 
percentage of ownership.            
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adopts many pragmatic market-oriented policies—and SOEs are main 
business entities in most sectors.       
Recently, the significance of Chinese SOEs in the world economy 
has been evident.  “More than half of the Chinese companies in the 2012 
Fortune Global 500 are SOEs supervised by an organ of the central 
government.”
160
  In many Chinese domestic markets, SOEs play as (quasi) 
monopolists with strong market power.
161
  In this respect, it is crucial to 
analyze which effects are expected if SOEs in domestic markets pursue 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm widely supported by 
economists, legal scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers in developed 
economies.  
By definition, the government is a controlling shareholder of 
SOEs.
162
  It is noteworthy, however, that the Chinese government is the 
“agent” of the citizens of China.
163
  In other words, the Chinese 
government resembles Janus, with two-faces, one as the principal of SOEs 
and the other as the agent of the Chinese people.  In principle, the citizens 
of China as a group are the “real principal” and the “ultimate 
shareholders”
164
 of SOEs.  Similar analysis can be applied in a context of 
Chinese SOEs that a local government owns on behalf of the local citizens.  
In order to maximize the welfare of the “ultimate shareholders,” it would 
be—in appearance—rational for SOEs to pursue the monopoly profit 
maximization strategy, by charging the high monopoly price (i.e., Pm) and 
producing the low level of quantity (i.e., Qm).   
                                                 
160 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:  Understanding 
the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 699 (2013) (citing 
State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n of the State Council, Central SOEs, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2971121/n4956567/4956583.html). “Many other 
Chinese firms on the Fortune Global 500 are SOEs controlled by provincial or local 
governments.”  Id. at 699 n.5.   
161 See China to Push Forward Reform of State-Owned Companies, CCTV (May 9, 2012, 
18:58), http://english.cntv.cn/program/newshour/20120509/118402.shtml (explaining 
briefly monopolistic features of Chinese SOEs and future reforms).   
162 For example, at the central government level the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), an organ of the party-state, 
supervises many SOEs.  See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 160, at 700 (explaining that “[the 
SASAC] has been described as ‘the world’s largest controlling shareholder’”) (citing 




163 See Clarke, supra note 32, at 499.  
164 More precisely, the citizens of China are not formally “shareholders” of SOEs.  Instead, 
the controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs is the government.  Accordingly, the citizens 
of China are “beneficiaries” under the government.  Nonetheless, this Article bases its 
explanations on the notion that the citizens of China are “ultimate shareholders” of SOEs, 
since such an analysis is functionally correct. 
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In the above analysis, however, one important point is not taken 
into account.  In general, consumers and shareholders are different groups, 
even if it is possible that a shareholder group constitutes a subset of 
consumers.  Under this general view, one main issue related to (quasi) 
monopoly profits is the wealth transfer from a consumer group to a 
shareholder group.  In an imperfectly competitive market, the shareholder 
group is better off and the consumer group is worse off.
165
  Although the 
shareholder primacy norm would be counterproductive to social welfare as 
a whole, at the very least the norm is beneficial to the shareholder group in 
an industrial organization with monopoly or oligopoly.  However, this 
general analysis is unlikely to apply to (quasi) monopoly SOEs 
particularly when the government holds 100% ownership (or a high 
percentage of ownership).
166
  In such cases, “ultimate shareholders” of 
SOEs are, roughly speaking, the same as consumers in the domestic 
market.
167
  For instance, an SOE owned by a local government provides a 
certain service to local consumers, who are actually “ultimate shareholders” 
of the SOE.       
Under these circumstances, consider the impacts of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm—if it is strictly pursued by 
Chinese SOE managers—on the welfare of the “ultimate shareholders.”  
The norm increases the profits of an SOE, for the benefit of the “ultimate 
shareholders.”  On the other hand, the welfare of consumers is hurt by the 
monopoly profit maximization.  Technically speaking, a substantial 
amount of surplus is transferred from consumers to the “ultimate 
shareholders.”  Since two conceptually divided groups are actually one 
group, the transfer of resources simply takes place from a person’s right 
pocket to the left pocket.  One critical problem is that the size of DWL—
visually depicted as Harberger’s triangle—is enlarged during the course of 
such a transfer.  Consequently, the shareholder wealth maximization norm 
will result in a net loss to the “ultimate shareholders.”     
Suppose that “consumer primacy”—rather than shareholder 
primacy—is pursued as the main policy of SOEs in China.  On the one 
                                                 
165 See KRUGMAN & WELLS, supra note 6, at 371. 
166 When the government holds 100% ownership of an SOE, in theory, the citizens of 
China as a group holds 100% ownership via the government.         
167 It is noteworthy, however, that there are SOE cases where “ultimate shareholders” 
would not be same as “consumers.”  First, by means of voting leverage devices such as 
stock pyramiding, it is possible that the government can control an SOE with a fractional 
ownership (e.g., 25%).  In this example, while the citizens of China (as a group) are 
“consumers,” they account for merely 25% of “ultimate shareholders.”  Accordingly, the 
group of “ultimate shareholders” is a subset of the group of “consumers.”  Second, suppose 
that an SOE is run by a local government, but provides goods or services to all citizens of 
China.  Even if the SOE is wholly owned by the local government, two groups would not 
be same.  These situations are beyond the scope of this Article, and will be explored in 
more depth by my future research projects.       
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hand, a certain portion of profits—that an SOE could have collected, if the 
profit maximization strategy had been pursued—for the “ultimate 
shareholders” would be given up.  This portion is obviously a loss (or an 
opportunity cost) to the citizens of China.  On the other hand, as a large 
consumer group, the citizens of China will benefit from a lower price 
(which is lower than Pm and approaches Pc) and a higher quantity (which 
is higher than Qm and approaches Qc).  The combined effect is more 
desirable to the citizens of China.  For this reason, given that the current 
regime of monopolistic SOEs is firmly established in Chinese market and 
legal systems—thus, impractical to reform on a large scale in the short 
term—pursuing a policy that is purely in line with the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm could generate unintended negative consequences.   
As discussed, Roe made an argument that the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm is not fit for a (quasi) monopoly economy, since it 
reduces national welfare.
168
  I argue that the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm is not fit for at least some Chinese SOEs, since it can 
be harmful to the “ultimate shareholders,” not to mention that it risks 
lowering social welfare.  Table 3 summarizes the above analysis.  
Although Table 3 provides a simplified framework, it is a good start for 
future research on the welfare of consumers and “ultimate shareholders” 
of Chinese SOEs.
169
        
 
Table 3: Welfare of Ultimate Shareholders of Chinese SOEs When Profits Are 







Wealth Transfer   --
- (i) + A – A 
Deadweight Loss   -
-- (ii) – C – B 
(i) + (ii) [+ A – C]   --- (iii) [– A – B]   --- (iv) 
Total Benefit/Cost [A – C] + [– A – B] = [– B – C] 
                                                 
168 See supra text accompanying note 12.      
169 Note that the underlying assumption of Table 3 is that the “ultimate shareholder” group 
is roughly same as consumer group.  In regard to this assumption, additional issues that 
will be further analyzed in an independent project are as follows:  (1) How are outcomes in 
Table 3 different, if an SOE has consumers in foreign countries?; (2) How does CMS—
when it dilutes the government’s ownership very much—affect the analysis in Table 3?; 
(3) What if a province government owns an SOE that also has consumers in other 
provinces?; and (4) How does (and can) an SOE really distribute benefits to its “ultimate 
shareholders”?        
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of Ultimate 
Shareholders [(iii) + 
(iv)] 
 Notation (based on supra Figure 1 and supra Part II.B.1) 
A: Rectangle A 
B: Triangle B 
C: Triangle C 
+ : Benefit 
– : Cost 
 Shareholder Group = Consumer Group 
Thus, under the shareholder wealth maximization norm in a 
(quasi) monopoly, the total benefit/cost of “ultimate 
shareholders” is:  (iii) + (iv) = [A – C] + [– A – B] = [– B – 
C].  Accordingly, the shareholder wealth maximization norm 




In The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial 
Organization, Roe raised a significant and fundamental question, namely, 
whether the shareholder wealth maximization norm is fit to be the global 
corporate governance standard in countries dominated by (quasi) 
monopolies.  Despite his huge contribution in this uncharted territory 
between industrial organization and corporate governance, Roe did not 
cover important issues such as CMS, tunneling, and the application of 
shareholder primacy to the Chinese economy and SOEs.  Based on Roe’s 
omissions, this Article uses a complex analytical framework to explore the 
question of (quasi) monopoly, shareholder wealth maximization, investor 
protection, and national welfare.
170
   
When a controller’s economic interests in a (quasi) monopoly 
corporation account for only a small fraction (i.e., a deep CMS), the 
controller has a weak incentive to follow the profit maximization norm.  
Under these circumstances, public shareholders would be damaged due to 
the deviation from the maximized-profit point.  However, it is generally 
expected that consumers and the national economy as a whole would 
inadvertently—perhaps without the CMS controller’s bona fide intent—
benefit relative to cases where the shareholder primacy norm is pursued in 
a strict manner.  The lower a CMS controller’s ownership stake in a 
                                                 
170 See supra Part III and Part IV. 
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corporation is, the weaker the incentive to comply with shareholder wealth 
maximization.          
By definition, tunneling is detrimental to public shareholders.  An 
interesting byproduct of tunneling in a (quasi) monopoly CMS corporation 
is that a CMS controller, ceteris paribus, has an additional incentive to 
consider a profit maximization strategy (due to a higher level of the CMS 
controller’s economic interests in the corporation) that would be 
potentially beneficial to public shareholders.  Of course, if the negative 
impact of tunneling on public shareholders overwhelms the positive one, 
public shareholders would end up with welfare loss.  Nonetheless, 
commentators should recognize—at least at a conceptual level—the 
potentially positive corporate governance feature of tunneling.  In addition, 
given CMS, tunneling of substantially all corporate assets is the worst 
scenario in terms of industrial organization, corporate governance 
(investor protection), and social welfare.
171
     
Regarding SOEs in China, the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm, if it is strictly transplanted, would create unintended negative 
effects to the economy given legal and market institutions in China which 
are not easily reformed.  Specifically, the norm—which is intended to 
protect shareholders and make them better off—will, ironically, lower the 
welfare level of the “ultimate shareholders” in Chinese SOEs, not to 






                                                 
171 See supra Part III.C.1. 
172 See supra Part IV. 
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